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1. Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are divided in two main classes, symmetric systems where keys are secret and
asymmetric approaches with public keys. The security of this second category is based on algebraic
problems known to be difficult to solve. Historically, in 1976, Diffie-Hellman described a protocol
[26] which was one of the first crypto-systems based on the discrete logarithm problem. Later, the
introduction of the elliptic curve in cryptography was promoted by V. Miller [55] and N. Koblitz [47]
and a large spectrum of crypto-systems appeared. Pairings are bilinear maps which allow to transform
an approach on abelian curves, such as elliptic ones, to a problem on finite fields. A first use of such
maps concerns cryptanalysis and was proposed in1993 by Menezes Okamoto and Vanstone [53] and in
1994 by G. Frey and H.G. Rück [36] they linked pairings to the discrete logarithmic problem on curves.
In 2000, A. Joux [45] had proposed a tripartite Diffie-Hellmann keys exchange using pairing. That was
the beginning of a blossoming literature on the subject. In 2003, D. Boneh and M. Franklin broke a
challenge given by Shamir[65] in 1984, creating an identity-based encryption scheme [19] based on
pairings. The construction of the pairings is based on the algorithm proposed in 1986 by Victor Miller
[54, 56]. A consequence of the rich literature on this subject [62] was the creation of a conference
devoted to pairing based cryptography, Pairings [60].
With the birth of this new domain of investigation in cryptography, the problem of implementing these
protocols occurs. This point is very relevant to the interest of pairings, the costs and the performances
of the implementation make a cryptosystem available. Some good studies on pairings implementation
are given by P. Barreto et al [13, 15], we can also refer to some books [29, 37]. We detail later what is
a pairing, but at a high level: a pairing is a bilinear map between two groups G1,G2 into a third group
G3 all abelian groups and of the same order.
e : G1×G2 −→G3
© 2013 El Mrabet; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The bilinearity is the property that
e(a ·A,b ·B) = e(A,B)a·b.
For efficient realization G1 and G2 are subgroups of an elliptic curve and G3 is a subgroup of a finite
field. The size of the group is fixed by security considerations and lays on the fact that the discrete
logarithm problem is hard to solve over G1,G2 and G3. The pairings are mainly computed with the
Miller’s algorithm. As a pairing evaluation can be enclosed in a smart card, the question of an efficient
implementation is very important.
Several publications are dealing with the efficiency of implementation of pairings. Each of them focus
on one aspect of the implementation. We want here to bring together each possible optimizations. The
outline of the chapter is the following. First in Section 2 we present the necessary background for a
pairing implementation. We present the two first pairings the Weil and the Tate pairings, as well as
the optimizations of these, the Eta pairing, the Ate pairing, the twisted Ate pairing, which leads to the
notion of optimal pairing and pairing lattices. We also give a first analysis of the arithmetic of pairings.
In Section 4, we present the mathematical optimizations of pairings. The use of twisted elliptic curves
which leads to the denominator elimination, the improvement of a squaring using cyclotomic subgroups.
In Section 5, we present the arithmetical optimizations of a pairing implementation. We describe the
different options for an efficient multiplication in Section 5.2, 5.3, 5.3.1 and 5.4. We describe as well
how an original representation of a finite field can improve a pairing computation in Section 5.5. In
Section 5.6, we describe how the choice of the model of elliptic curve and of its coordinates has a
consequence on the implementation. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2. Background and notation
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field Fq, with P∞ denoting the identity element of the associated
group of rational points E(Fp). For a positive integer r|#E(Fp) coprime to p, let Fpk be the smallest
extension field of Fp which contains the r-th roots of unity in Fp; the extension degree k is called the
security multiplier or embedding degree. Let E(Fp)[r] (respectively E(Fpk )[r]) denote the subgroup
of E(Fp) (respectively E(Fpk )) of all points of order dividing r. The two groups G1 and G2 will be
subgroups of elliptic curve groups and G3 is a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a finite field.
2.1. The Weil, Tate and Ate pairings
2.1.1. The Miller algorithm
The Miller algorithm is the most important step for the Weil, Tate and Ate pairings computation. It is
constructed like a double and add scheme using the construction of [r]P. Miller’s algorithm is based on
the notion of divisors. We only give here the essential elements for the pairing computation.
The Miller algorithm constructs the rational function fr,P associated to the point P, where P is a
generator of G1 ⊂ E(Fp); and at the same time, it evaluates fr,P(Q) for a point Q ∈ G2 ⊂ E(Fpk ).
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Algorithm 1: Miller(P,Q, l)
Data: l = (ln . . . l0)(radix 2 representation), P ∈G1(⊂ E(Fp)) and Q ∈G2(⊂ E(Fpk ));
Result: FP(Q) ∈G3(⊂ F
∗
pk
);
1 : T ← P ;
2 : f1← 1 ;
3 : f2← 1 ;
for i = n−1 to 0 do
4 : T ← [2]T , 5 : f1←− f1
2
×h1(Q), h1(x) is the equation of the tangent at the point T ;
if li = 1 then
6 : T ← T +P ;
7 : f1 ←− f1×h2(Q), h2(x) is the equation of the line (PT );
end
end
return f1
2.1.2. The pairings
Definition 2.1. The Weil pairing, denoted eW , is defined by:
eW : G1×G2 → G3,
(P,Q) → (−1)r fr,P(Q)
fr,Q(P)
.
Definition 2.2. The Tate pairing, denoted eTate, is defined by:
G1×G2 7→ G3
(P,Q) 7→ eTate(P,Q) = fr,P(Q).
Here, the function fr,P is normalized, i.e. (u
r
0 fr,P)(P∞) = 1 for some Fp-rational uniformizer at P∞.
This pairing is only defined up to a representative of (Fpk )
r. In order to obtain a unique value we raise
it to the power
pk−1
r , obtaining an r-th root of unity that we call the reduced Tate pairing
eˆTate(P,Q) = fr,P(Q)
pk−1
r .
Let pip be the Frobenius map over the elliptic curve: pip : E → E : (x,y)→ (xp,yp). We denote the
Frobenius trace by t. Let T = t−1, G1 := E[r]∩Ker(pip− [1]) and G2 := E[r]∩Ker(pip− [q])
Theorem 2.3. For P ∈G1 and p ∈G2 the following properties hold [43]:
⋄ fT ,Q(P) is a bilinear pairing called the Ate pairing.
⋄ Let N = gcd(T k− 1, pk− 1) and T k− 1 = NL, then eTate(Q,P)
L = fT ,Q(P)
c(pk−1)/N , where c =
∑
k−1
i=0T
k−1−i pi ≡ kpk−1mod(r)
⋄ for r not dividing L, the Ate pairing is non degenerated.
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We therefore obtain the reduced Ate pairing fT ,Q(P)
(pk−1)/r which is a power of the Tate pairing. As
the trace t is in average of size
√
p, for r∼ p, the loop length of Miller’s algorithm when computing the
Ate pairing is obviously going to be two times shorter than the loop length for the Tate pairing.
2.2. The Duursma-Lee pairing
Duursma and Lee use a family of hyperelliptic curves including supersingular curves over finite fields
of characteristic three and adapt it to pairing.
For Fp with p = 3m and k = 6, suitable curves are defined by an equation of the form
E : y2 = x3− x+ b,
with b = ±1 ∈ F3. If Fp3 = Fp[ρ ]/(ρ3− ρ − b), and Fp6 = Fp3 [σ ]/(σ2 + 1) then the distortion
map φ : E(Fp)→ E(Fp6 ) is defined by φ (x,y) = (ρ− x,σy). Then, setting G1 = G2 = E(F3m ) and
G3 = Fp6 , Algorithm 2 computes an admissible, symmetric pairing.
Algorithm 2: The Duursma-Lee pairing algorithm.
Input : P = (xP,yP) ∈G1 and Q = (xQ,yQ) ∈G2.
Output: e(P,Q) ∈G3.
f ← 1;
for i = 1 upto m do
xP← x3P, yP← y3P;
µ ← xP + xQ + b;
λ ←−yPyQσ −µ2;
g← λ −µρ−ρ2;
f ← f ·g;
xQ← x1/3Q , yQ← y1/3Q ;
end
return f p
3−1;
2.3. The η and ηG pairings
Barreto et al. [12] introduce the η pairing by generalising the Duursma-Lee pairing to allow use of
supersingular curves over finite fields of any small characteristic; Kwon [49] independently used the
same approach and in both cases characteristic two is of specific interest. The η pairing has already
a simple final powering, but work done by Galbraith et al. [38] (see [59, Section 5.4]) demonstrates
that it can be eliminated entirely; the crucial step is the lack of normal denominator elimination,
which is enabled by evaluation of additional line functions. Interestingly, the analysis of this approach
demonstrates no negative security implication in terms of pairing inversion and so on. We follow
Whelan and Scott [71] by terming this approach to the ηG pairing.
For Fp with p = 2m and k = 4, suitable curves are defined by an equation of the form
E : y2+ y = x3+ x+ b
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Algorithm 3: The η pairing algorithm.
Input : P = (xP,yP) ∈G1 and Q = (xQ,yQ) ∈G2.
Output: e(P,Q) ∈G3.
f ← 1;
for i = 1 upto m do
xP ← x
2
P, yP ← y
2
P;
µ ← xP + xQ;
λ ← µ + xPxQ + yP + yQ + b;
g← λ + µt +(µ + 1)t2;
f ← f ·g;
xQ ← x
1/2
Q , yQ ← y
1/2
Q ;
end
return f p
2−1;
Algorithm 4: The ηG pairing algorithm.
Input : P = (xP,yP) ∈G1 and Q = (xQ,yQ) ∈G2.
Output: e(P,Q) ∈G3.
with b ∈ F2. If Fp2 = Fp[s]/(s
2 + s + 1) and Fp4 = Fp2 [t]/(t
2 + t + s) then the distortion map
φ : E(Fp)→ E(Fp4 ) is defined by φ (x,y) = (x+ s
2,y+ sx+ t). Note that s = t5 and that t satisfies
t4 = t +1, so we can also represent Fp4 as Fp[t]/(t
4+ t +1). Then, by setting G1 = G2 = E(Fp) and
G3 = Fp4 , Algorithm 4 computes an admissible, symmetric pairing.
Historically, the Weil and Tate pairing was developed by mathematicians without any consideration
for cryptography. As efficient implementation of pairings become an interesting question for
cryptographers, they searched for improving these two pairings. The Ate and twisted Ate pairing were
improvement of the Tate pairing, throught mathematical properties [43]. The notion of Optimal pairing
[70] and pairing lattices [42] are the latest properties of pairing. The number of iterations is reduced
to the minimum in [70]. In [42], F. Hess proves that every pairing are in relation, because the different
pairings are in fact element of a lattice in which each pairing is a power of another pairing. To present
the following Sections, we work over the Tate pairing, since as any optimizations of the Tate pairing
can be easily adapted to others pairings.
2.4. Analysis of the arithmetic
In order to present the different existing options for the optimizations of a pairing computation, we will
focus on the Miller’s algorithm. Among the several algorithms which exist to compute a pairing, the
most efficient implementations are obtained with the Miller’s algorithm.
Let P = (XP,YP) be a point in affine coordinates of the set E(Fp)[r] (or in Jacobian coordinates with
ZP = 1). We consider the point p of order r in E(Fpk ), also given in affine coordinates (xQ,yQ). Let
G1 =< P> be the subgroup of order r of E(Fp) generated by the point P and G2 =<Q> the subgroup
of order r of E(Fpk ). We want to compute a pairing between G1 and G2, under the condition G1 6= G2.
The group G3 is a subgroup of order r of F
⋆
pk
.
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Let T = (XT ,YT ,ZT ) be a point of E(Fpk ) in Jacobian coordinates. The main advantage of Jacobian
coordinates is that there is no inversion during the arithmetical operation over the elliptic curve.
The Miller’s algorithm is given in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: Miller(P,Q,r)
Données: r = (rn . . .r0)(binary representation), P ∈G1(⊂ E(Fp)) and Q ∈G2(⊂ E(Fpk ));
Résultat: fr,P(Q) ∈G3(⊂ F
⋆
pk
);
1. T ← P ;
2. f1← 1 ;
3. f2← 1 ;
for i = n−1 to 0 do
4. T ← [2]T ;
5. f1←− f1
2
× l1(Q), l1 is the tangent at point T of E. ;
6. f2←− f2
2
× v1(Q), v1 is the vertical line at point [2]T . ;
( Div( l1v1 ) = 2(T )− ([2]T )−P∞);
if ni = 1 then
7. T ← T +P ;
8. f1←− f1× l2(Q), l2 is the line (PT ) ;
9. f2←− f2× v2(Q), v2 is the vertical line at P+T ;
( Div( l2v2 ) = (T )+DP− ((T )⊕DP)−P∞);
end
return
f1
f2
end
The functions l1(Q), l2(Q), v1(Q) and v2(Q) occurring in Miller’s algorithm have their images in F
⋆
pk
.
The parameters f1 and f2 are elements of F
⋆
pk
.
The order r of the subgroups is chosen with a very sparse binary decomposition. In this case, the
addition step in Miller’s algorithm is not often executed, whereas the doubling step is computed for
every iteration of the Miller’s algorithm. As a consequence, we consider that the complexity of Miller’s
algorithm is approximately given by the doubling step. So we will only consider the computation of l1
and v1 in the complexity evaluation of Miller’s algorithm.
In a general case, we consider that the equation of the elliptic curve is given into the Weierstrass form
E : Y 2 = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6, with a and b elements of Fp. In order to be very general, we consider
a and b ordinary. Indeed, it is possible to consider that a = −3 [20] and the value of b is also a
vector of optimizations, but we do not take in consideration these options. We denote P = (XP,YP),
T = (XT ,YT ,ZT ) is the current point in the Miller’s algorithm and 2T = (X2T ,Y2T ,Z2T ) the doubling
of T .
The formulas of the doubling in Jacobian coordinates are the following [25]
C = 2Y 2T , D = Z
2
T , A = 4XTY
2
T = 2XTC, B = (3X
2
T + aZ
4
T ) (1)
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X2T = B
2
−2A, Y2T = B(A−X2T )−2C
2, Z2T = 2YT ZT . (2)
In this case, the expressions of l1 and v1, for Q = (xQ,yQ) ∈ E(Fpk ) are given by
l1(xQ,yQ) = Z
2
P(Z2T DyQ−B(DxQ−XT )−2YT ) (3)
v1(xQ,yQ) = Z
2
2T ZPxQ + 4Y
2
P (XPD+XT Z
2
P)−Z
2
PB
2. (4)
We could remark that some intermediary results of the previous formulas may be reused, for instance
Y 2T , Z
2
T , 4XTY
2
T , (3X
2
T + aZ
4
T ). This precomputation reduce the cost of the doubling step, considering
the number of operations over the finite field Fp.
Let Ape (respectively Subpe , Sqpe and Mpe ) denote an addition (respectively a subtraction, a squaring and
a multiplication) in the finite field Fpe , for e a natural integer. Let also Ma be the cost of a multiplication
by a. The Table 1 gives the cost of each operation occurring in the computation of the doubling step.
Each cost is given in number of operations over the finite fields. We optimize the computation as
possible without any trick different from the one which are following. We consider that a multiplication
by 2 is nothing more than a shift in binary representation and thus may be neglected. As a consequence,
a multiplication by 3 can be seen as a multiplication by 2 plus an addition and then a multiplication by
3 is equivalent to an addition.
Doubling of a point over E 4Ap + 3Subp +Ma + 4Sp + 4Mp
Evaluation of l1 2Subp + Subpk SP +(3+ 3k)MP
Evaluation of v1 2Ap + Subp + 3SP +(5+ k)MP
Step 1 in Algorithm 5 6Ap + 4Subp + Subpk + 8Sp +(12+ 4k)Mp + 2Spk + 2Mpk
Table 1. Cost of the doubling step in Miller’s algorithm
We will present in Section 4 the optimizations related with mathematics and in Section the optimization
in pairings related with the arithmetic of finite fields, in Section 4 the optimizations related with
mathematics, in Section 5 the optimizations related with algorithmical breakout.
3. Pairing based cryptography
The first use of pairing in cryptography was destructive: in [53] the Weil pairing was used to shift the
discrete logarithm problem from an elliptic curve to a finite field. As the discrete logarithm problem is
more easily solved over a finite field than over an elliptic curve, the MOV attack consists in transfering
a hard problem over a structure where the same problem is easier. The MOV attack is named after its
authors Menezes Okamoto and Vanstome. Later on the pairing was used to improve existing protocols
as tri-partite Diffie Hellman key exchange [45] and to construct original protocol like identity based
encryption [19, 21].
The aim of identity based encryption is that a person λ , even if λ does not know anything about
cryptography, is able to receive and more importantly to read an encrypted message with almost no
help.
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The public key of λ is its identity, its private key would be send to λ by a trusted authority T. This
trusted authority will have all the private keys related with the identity based protocol.
The general scheme of identity based encryption is the following.
The public data are an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp, a pairing eˆ and a hash function H, this hash
function associates a point of E(Fp) to an identity: H : {Identity} → E(Fp). We consider that two
person Alice and Bob want to exchange a common secret for use it as a key in a secure communication.
With the public data, Alice can compute QB = H(Bob) the public key of Bob and Bob can compute
QA = H(Alice) the public key of Alice.
Alice and Bob request the trusted authority to receive their secret key. The secret key is a point of
E(Fp).
The trusted authority chooses s, as its secret key, then it generates PA = [s]QA the secret key of Alice
and PB = [s]QB the secret key of Bob.
Then, Alice (respectively Bob) can compute eˆ(PA,QB) (resp. eˆ(QA,PB), by bilinearity, Alice and Bob
have calculated the same key: eˆ(QA,QB)
[s]. Indeed:
eˆ([s]H(A),H(B)) = eˆ(H(A), [s]H(B)) = eˆ(H(A),H(B))[s].
4. Mathematical optimizations
We recall here the mathematical optimizations of pairings. As a pairing is defined over an elliptic
curve which is an abelian variety, the first optimization for a pairing computation comes from the
mathematical background of pairings. We will use the twist of an elliptic curve, the pairing friendly
elliptic curve will follow. We will consider the cyclotomic subgroup of a finite field and then how the
final exponentiation in a pairing computation can be improve.
4.1. The twist of an elliptic curve
The twisted elliptic curve of E is another elliptic curve isomorphic to E. Using twisted elliptic curves
(when it is possible) in pairing based cryptography is a way to avoid the denominator evaluation in
Miller’s algorithm. The execution of Miller’s algorithm involves computation over E(Fpk ), considering
a twist of degree d of E(Fpk ) allows some computations to be executed in E˜(Fpk/d ), where E˜(Fpk/d )
is the twisted elliptic curve of E(Fpk ) [64].
Definition 4.1. Let E and E ′ be two elliptic curves, the elliptic curve E ′ is a twisted elliptic curve of
E if there exists an isomorphisme Φ defined over Fp mapping each point of E
′ to a point of E.
There is a limited number of twisted elliptic curves of E. The number of twisted curves depends on the
finite field on which the elliptic curve E is defined. The Theorem 4.2 from [64] gives the classification
of the possible twists.
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Theorem 4.2. Let E be an elliptic curve of equation y2 = x3 + ax+ b defined over Fpk . Following
the value of k, the possible degrees d of twists are 2, 3, 4 and 6. Let E ′ be a twist of E, the morphism
between E and E ′ is one of the following.
• d = 2, E ′ : Dy2 = x3 + ax+ b defined over Fpk/2 , where D ∈ Fpk/2 is not a quadratic residue, i.e.
such that the polynomial X2−D has no solution over Fpk/2 . The morphism Φd is defined by
Φd : E
′ → E
Φd(x,y) → (x,yD1/2).
• d = 4. The elliptic curve E has a twist of degree 4 if and only if b = 0. The equation of E ′ is then
y2 = x3+ aD x, where D is not a residue of degree 4, i.e. D is not solution in Fpk/4 of a polynomial
X4−D. The morphism is then
Φd : E
′ → E
Φd(x,y) → (xD1/2,yD3/4).
• d = 3 (resp. 6), the curve E has a twist of degree 3 or 6 if and only if a = 0. The equation of
E ′ is then y2 = x3 + bD , where D is not a residue of degree 3 (resp. 6), i.e. D is not solution of a
polynomial X3−D (resp. X6−D). The morphism is then
Φd : E
′ → E
Φd(x,y) → (xD1/3,yD1/2).
Considering the definition above, an elliptic curve can admit a twist of degree 2, 3, 4 or 6. We will
only consider here the twisted elliptic curve for an even degree. In order to simplify the notations,
we will consider a twist of degree 2. The same method can be applied for twists of degree 4 and 6.
The case of twist of degree 3 is a little different, but can also be considered, we refer to [31] for more
details. Using a twisted elliptic curve of E(Fpk ) allows to make some computation of the Miller’s
algorithm in a subfield of Fpk , instead of Fpk and thus allows to simplify the computation. Using a
twisted elliptic curve is the solution to avoid the denominators in the Miller’s algorithm (i.e. the update
of the function f2). We will denote E˜(Fpk/2 ) the twisted curve of E(Fpk ), for an even k. We could
remark that the twisted elliptic curve of E is an elliptic curve define over an extension of degree half of
the initial extension (Fpk ) [11]. Let ν ∈ Fpk/2 a non square element in Fpk/2 , then
√
ν is an element of
Fpk \Fpk/2 . We can define E˜ the twisted elliptic curve of E(Fpk ) of equation νy2 = x3−3x+ b. The
morphism mapping E˜(Fpk/2 ) to E(Fpk ) is Ψ2 define by
Ψ2 : E˜(Fpk/2 ) → E(Fpk )
(x,y) → (x,y√ν).
The probability that the point Q = (x,y
√
ν) image of Q′ = (x,y) ∈ E˜ by Ψ2 belongs to the subgroup
generate by P ∈ E(Fp) is negligeable [11]. This assures us that the pairing is non degenerated between
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P ∈ E(Fp) and Q = Ψ2(Q′). As a consequence, we can consider that the coordinates of the point Q
are element of Fpk/2 plus a multiplication by
√
ν .
We give the formulae for Miller’s algorithm with the use of a twisted elliptic curve. Let A, B,C, D, E and
F be the intermediate values in the doubling and addition of a point over E (in Jacobian coordinates).
These values are dependant only on the point P = (XP;YP;ZP) and multiples of P: T = (XT ;YT ;ZT );
2T = (X2T ;Y2T ;Z2T ) and T +P = (X3;Y3;Z3). The equations of functions l1, l2, v1 and v2 are
l1(xQ,yQ
√
ν) = Z2P(Z2T DyQ
√
ν−B(DxQ−XT )−2YT ),
v1(xQ,yQ
√
ν) = Z22T ZPxQ + 4Y
2(XPD+XT Z
2
P)−9Z2P(X2T −Z4T )2,
l2(xQ,yQ
√
ν) = Z2T+P(Z
3
T EyQ
√
ν−ZT F(Z2T xQ)−YT E),
v2(xQ,yQ
√
ν) = Z3T E(Z
3
3xQ +E(A+B)−Z2T Z2PF).
(5)
The multiplications and additions in these formulae are made in Fp and Fpk/2 . For xQ ∈ Fpk/2 , if
we consider carefully the equations of v1 and v2, we can remark that the results v1(xQ,yQ
√
ν) and
v2(xQ,yQ
√
ν) are elements of Fpk/2 . Indeed, the y-coordinate of Q does not appear in the denominator
v1 and consequently
√
ν either. This simple remark allows the elimination of the denominators during
the Tate pairing computation.
Property 4.3. During the evaluation of Miller’s algorithm for the Tate pairing, the evaluation of f2
and thus the computations of v1 and v2 can be omited [11].
Indeed, when using a twist, the equation shows that v1(Q), v2(Q) ∈ Fpk/2 and then f2 ∈ Fpk/2 . By
definition of the embedding degree k of the elliptic curve,
pk−1
r is a multiple of p
k/2−1 and f
pk−1
r
2 = 1
by the following proposition.
Property 4.4. Let r be a prime divisor of #E(Fp) and E be an elliptic curve of embedding degree k
relatively to r. Then
pk−1
r is a multiple of p
k/2−1.
Proof. The demonstration is a straight forward consequence of the construction of k as the smallest
integer such that r divides pk−1. So for an even k, pk−1= (pk/2−1)(pk/2+1) and r a prime integer
divides pk − 1. Using the Gauss theorem, r divides (pk/2− 1) or (pk/2+ 1). If r divides (pk/2− 1),
then the definition of k would be wrong, thus the only possibility is that r divides (pk/2+ 1).
For all ξ ∈ Fpk/2 , we know that ξ p
k/2−1 ≡ 1 (from the Little Fermat’s theorem). Consequently the final
exponentiation of the Tate pairing kills every factor of the result belonging to a proper subfield of Fpk .
The Miller’s computation can be simplified by forgetting v1 and v2. But with the same remark, we can
also simplify the function l1 and l2 into
l1(xQ,yQ
√
ν) = Z2T DyQ
√
ν−B(DxQ−XT )−2YT ,
l2(xQ,yQ
√
ν) = Z3T EyQ
√
ν−ZT F(Z2T xQ)−YT E.
(6)
This method can be applied for every pairing with a final exponentiation. In the case of the Weil
pairing, we can also apply it by raising the result of Weil pairing at the power pk/2−1. The cost of this
exponentiation will be study in Section 4.4.
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In order to illustrate the simplification of the computation with the use of a pairing, we compare two
computations of the doubling step in Miller’s algorithm. The Miller Lite execution is the computation of
the Miller’s algorithm for the Tate pairing (Miller(P,Q)). The Miller full execution is the computation
of Miller(Q,P). The Table 2 compare the cost of the doubling step in Miller Lite and Miller Full with
and without the use of twisted elliptic curve.
Miller Without twist With twist
Lite 8Sp +(12+ 4k)Mp + 2Spk + 2Mpk 4Sp +(7+ k)Mp + Spk +Mpk
Full 3kMp + 10Spk + 14Mpk kMp + 5Spk + 7Mpk
Table 2. Cost of Miller Lite and Miller Full
4.2. Pairing friendly fields and elliptic curves
The computation of pairings implies computations over extension fields of the form Fpk . If the
embedding degree k is smooth, than the arithmetic in Fpk can be computed step by step. A complete an
extensive nice definition of smooth number is given in [50], we recall here an intuitive naive definition.
Definition 4.5. A smooth integer is an integer such that its prime factor are composed only by small
primes.
Example 4.6. An integer of the form 2i3 j is smooth.
We illustrate how a smooth integer k allows a construction of Fpk with a tower field.
Example 4.7. Let l be a prime number and m an integer such that k = lm. The extension Fpk of Fp
can be constructed like an extension of degree l of Fpm . We suppose that we have already constructed
the extension Fpm . Let P(X) be an irreducible polynomial of degree l in Fpm [X ]. Then Fplm = F(pm)l
is constructed with the quotient
Fplm = Fpm [X ]/ (P(X)) .
We use the tower field construction in order to optimize the multiplication over Fpk . We will see
in Section 5 that for extensions of degree 2 and 3, we can use the Karatsuba and Toom Cook
multiplications. The tower field construction reduce the number of elementary operations over Fp
to compute a multiplication in Fpk [35].
A.Menezes and N.Koblitz [48] proposed the definition of pairing friendly elliptic curves. There are
elliptic curves suitable for pairing computation. Pairing friendly fields are defined with k smooth.
Definition 4.8. A pairing friendly field Fpk is an extension of a finite field Fp with the following
property
• the characteristic p is such that p ≡ 1 mod(12),
• the embedding degree k is such that k = 2i3 j.
Pairing friendly field are such that the polynomial reduction over the extension Fpk is very easy to
compute [50, Theorem 3.75].
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Theorem 4.9. Let β ∈ Fp be a neither a square nor a cube in Fp and Fpk a pairing friendly field with
k = 2i3 j. Then the polynomial Xk−β is irreducible in Fp.
Using the definition and the above property, we construct the extension Fpk = Fp[X ]/(X
k−β ) using
several extensions of degree 2 and 3. The construction is done step by step with square or cubic root of
β and the results.
Example 4.10. Example of possible tower field for k = 2231 :
Fp
2
→ L = Fp[T ]/(T
2−β ),
K
3
→M = L[U ]/(U3−T ),
L
2
→ N = M[V ]/(V 2−U).
The representation of fields L, M and N are as follow
L = {l0+ l1β , with l0, l1 ∈ Fp},
M = {m0+m1T +m2T
2, with m0,m1,m2 ∈ L},
N = {n0+ n1U , with n0,n1 ∈M}.
The arithmetic in Fpk can be composed in each floor of the tower field construction. As k is a product
of power of 2 and 3, the Karatsuba and Toom Cook methods are the more suitable for improving
the multiplication in Fpk . We consider that a multiplication in Fpk with k = 2
i3 j involves 3i5 j
multiplications in Fp, which is denoted Mpk = 3
i5 jMp.
4.3. Cyclotomic subgroup and squaring
A. Lenstra and M. Stam introduce in [52] an efficient method for squaring. They use the structure
of a cyclotomic subgroup. They construct an extension of degree 6 with a polynomial different from
X6−β . The cyclotomic subgroup Gφk(p) is the subgroup of order φk(p) of F
⋆
pk
, where φk(p) is the
kth cyclotomic polynomial evaluated at p. The cyclotomic polynomials are constructed such that there
roots are the primitive roots of unity.
The multiplication developed by Lenstra and Stam is interesting for computing squares in degree 6
extension of Fp (or a degree multiple of 6). It could be interesting to generalize it for other degree
extension. They construct the degree 6 extension using the cyclotomic polynomial φk(X) = X
k/3−
Xk/6+ 1. This method can be used for every degree extension multiple of 6.
Let α ∈Gφk(p), α =
k−1
∑
i=0
aiγ
i, where for all i, ai ∈ Fp and B = (1,γ ,γ
2, . . . ,γk−1) is a basis of Fpk .
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We are seeking for the general expression of an element in Gφk(p). We consider that α is a polynomial
in several variables in Fp (the ais), with coefficients power of γ in Fpk .
As α belong to the cyclotomic subgroup Gφk(p), the order of α divides the cardinal of Gφk(p) which is
φk(p). So, we have that α
pk/3−pk/6+1 = 1 in Gφk(p). This equality can be written α
pk/3+1 = α p
k/6
.
In order to find the decomposition of α×α p
k/3
−α p
k/6
, we can then formally compute α p
k/3
and α p
k/6
α×α p
k/3
−α p
k/6
=
k−1
∑
i=0
viγ
i.
Where
v0 = a
2
1−a0a2−a4−a
2
4+ a3a5,
v1 = −a0+ a1a2+ a3−2a0a3+ a
2
3−a2a4−a1a5,
v2 = −a0a1+ a3a4−a5−2a2a5+ a
2
5,
v3 = −a1−a2a3+ 2a1a4−a
2
4−a0a5+ a3a5,
v4 = a
2
0+ a1a2+ a3−2a0a3−a4a5,
v5 = −a2+ a
2
2−a1a3−a0a4+ a3a4−2a2a5.
As α ∈ Gφk(p), we have that
k−1
∑
i=0
viγ
i = 0. With this equation, we construct a system in the αi, the
resolution of this system will give us the general form of an element in Gφk(p).
The subgroup Gφk(p) is the set of elements α such that ∀i, vi = 0, which gives α
2 = α2+B.Γ.tv, with
B = (1,γ ,γ2, ...,γk−1) and with Γ a chosen matrix. As v is zero in Fp, we can reduce the cost of a
square with this method.
Denoting α2 =
k
∑
i=1
siγ
i, we have the equality
k
∑
i=1
siγ
i = (
k
∑
i=1
aiγ
i)2+B.Γt .v.
We can formally develop the right expression and for a well chosen matrix Γ, the formulae for a square
in Fpk would be simplified. For instance, for k = 6[52] :
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α2 = B.


2a1+ 3a4(a4−2a1)
2a0+ 3(a0+ a3)(a0−a3)
−2a5+ 3a5(a5−2a2)
2(a2−a4)+ 3a1(a1−2a4)
2(a0−a3)+ 3a3(2a0−a3)
−2a2+ 3a2(a2−2a5)


. (7)
Granger, Page and Smart apply this method to construct the Table 3 [41].
Degree extension k cost of a square in Fpk
6 4,5Mp
12 18Mp + 12Sp
24 84Mp + 24Sp
Table 3. Complexity of a square in F
pk
In the particular case where k = 6 and p ≡ 2 (mod 9), the cost of a square with the Lenstra and Stam
method is less than 0,75Mpk , which is usually the ratio of a square compare to a multiplication.
Example 4.11. In Fp6 , a square with Lenstra and Stam method cost 6× 0,75Mp ≈ 4,5Mp. With the
classical ratio, a square in Fp6 costs 15×0,75Mp ≈ 10Mp.
4.4. The finale exponentiation
The Tate pairing (and also the Ate, optimal Ate) is composed of two steps, first the Miller’s execution
and then a final exponentiation. This exponentiation is a very expensive operation as it takes place in
Fpk and the exponent
pk−1
r is a large integer. In order to simplify this exponentiation it is split in two
parts [48] using the fact that:
(pk−1)
r
=
(pk−1)
φk(p)
× φk(p)
r
,
where φk(p) is the evaluation in p of the k-th cyclotomic polynomial.
The first part of the exponentiation uses the twisted elliptic curve and it is equivalent to computing
the Frobenius map of elements in Fpk . The second part is a reduced exponentiation in Fpk which is
performed with classical method for exponentiation.
4.4.1. First part of the exponentiation
We consider here the exponentiation to the power
pk−1
φk(p)
. We can first remark that if k = 2i3 j, then
φk(p) = p
k/3 − pk/6 + 1 and p
k−1
φk(p)
= (pk/2 − 1)(pk/6 + 1). Using a twist, the result of Miller’s
algorithm is something like (X +Y
√
ν) avec X ,Y ∈ Fpk/2 .
The computation of (X +Y
√
ν)p
k/2−1 can be decomposed in
(X +Y
√
ν)p
k/2 × (X +Y
√
ν)−1.
Theory and Practice of Cryptography and Network Security Protocols and Technologies64
As (X +Y
√
ν)−1 = (X +Y
√
ν)p
k/2
, we have that
(X +Y
√
ν)p
k/2−1 = (X +Y
√
ν)2p
k/2
.
Raising an element of Fpk to a power p
k/2 is a Frobenius operation, which mainly consists in shifts. The
total cost of the exponentiation to the power (pk/2−1) is a square in Fpk and a Frobenius application.
Let (X ′+Y ′
√
ν) be the result of (X +Y
√
ν)p
k/2−1.
We then have to compute (X ′+Y ′
√
ν)p
k/6+1 which is another application of the Frobenius.
Let γ be a root of Xk−β in Fpk . An element a of Fpk can be decomposed in a =
k−1
∑
i=0
aiγ
i, with ai ∈ Fp.
The property of a finite field gives ap =
k−1
∑
i=0
aiγ
ip and recursively
ap
j
=
k−1
∑
i=0
aiγ
ip j .
For i and j two integers let qi j and ri j be the quotient and the remainder of the Euclidien division of ip
j
by k, we know that
γ ip
j
= β qi j mod(p)γri j .
The computation of (X ′+Y ′
√
ν)p
k/6+1 can be decomposed in
(X ′+Y ′
√
ν)p
k/6+1 = (X ′p
k/6
+Y ′p
k/6√
ν
(pk/6)
)× (X ′+Y ′
√
ν)
For example, if we describe what happened for the variable X ′ raised to the power pk/6, we obtain the
following step


X ′ =
k/2−1
∑
i=0
xiγ
i,
X ′p
k/6
=
k/2−1
∑
i=0
xiγ
ip(k/6) ,
X ′p
k/6
=
k/2−1
∑
i=0
(xiβ
qi(k/6) mod (p))γri(k/6) .
We have to compute the k2 products (xiβ
qi(k/6) mod(p)), with xi and β
qi(k/6) mod(p) in Fp. The total
complexity of the first part of the exponentiation is 2kMp +Spk +Mpk plus shifts and multiplications by
β .
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Second part of the exponentiation
The second part of the exponentiation is the hard part. We use classical method of exponentiation like
the Lucas sequences [16] or sliding windows [40]. In [67], more tricky method are developed.
The Lucas sequence method induces a cost of a square and a multiplication in the intermediate field
Fpk/2 for each bit of the exponent. The sliding window method has the advantage that the squares are
computed in the cyclotomic subgroup and consequently we can use the method described in Section
4.3. The complexity of the two methods is linearly related to the number of the bits in the binary
decomposition of the exponent, we recall here the complexity of the methods and refer to for instance
the book [25] for more details.
Let br be the number of bits of r, the prime number dividing the cardinal of E. Let bpk be the number of
bits of pk. The respective size of br, bpk , r and p
k are fixed by the security level we want to reach. We
give them in the Table 4. The number of positive integers smaller than k and prime with k is ϕ(k), the
Euler totent function evaluated at k. The number ϕ(k) is also the number of primitive k-roots of unity,
then it is the degree of the polynomial φk(p). The exponent of the second part of the exponentiation is
( ϕ(k)k bpk −br) bits.
The number of squares and multiplications involved for the computation of the exponentiation depends
on
ϕ(k)
k bpk −br = (τkγ −1)br, where
γ =
bpk
br
,
τk =
ϕ(k)
k
=
{
1/2 si k = 2i, i > 1
1/3 si k = 2i3 j, i, j > 1 .
The number γ is related to the security levels given in the Table 4 and its is a good appreciation of the
total complexity of the exponentiation.
Security level in bits 80 128 192 256
Minimal number of for r 160 256 384 512
Minimal number of for pk 1 024 3 072 7 680 15 360
γ =
b
pk
br
6,4 12 20 30
Table 4. Security level
The complexity of the Lucas sequance method is [16]
CLuc = (Mpk/2 + Spk/2 ) log2
(
φk(p)
r
)
.
The complexity of the sliding window method is [40]
Csw =
(
log2(e)
log2(p)
+ log2(p)
)
SGφk (p)
+
(
log2(e)
log2(p)
(
2n−1−1
)
+
log2(e)
n+ 2
−1
)
Mpk ,
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where e = φk(p)r , and n is the integer giving the size of the window in bits, generally n = 4.
5. Arithmetical optimisation
As the pairings computation lays on arithmetic over finite fields, a way to improve the efficiency of
computation of pairings is to improve the arithmetic of finite fields and extension of finite fields.
The elliptic curve used in pairing based cryptography are constructed throught the complex
multiplication method. These methods of constructions do not allow to fixe p the characteristic of
the field Fp, we can only choose the number of bits in the decomposition of p. As a consequence, the
arithmetic of pairings is particular. We cannot choose p with a special structure which would provide an
efficient arithmetic, like for example a sparse decomposition or a Mersenne or Pseudo Mersenne prime.
A very nice overview of construction of elliptic curve for pairing based cryptography is available in the
work of Freeman, Scott and Teske [33].
We then begin this section with the presentation of efficient multiplications in finite fields and extensions
of finite fields. We recall the different methods for a multiplication and we will provide a comparison
of efficiency of these multiplications in Section 5.2, 5.3, 5.4. In Section 5.5, we will consider the
representation of elements in a finite field. Indeed, in Section 5.1 we describe the classical representation
of a finite field, this classical representation is used for the description of the multiplications. But it is
possible, to have original representations of finite field, which can offer opportunities for improvement
in pairing based cryptography. In Section 5.6 we will consider how the choice of coordinates can be a
way for improving the efficiency of computation of pairings and on the equation of the elliptic curve.
5.1. Setting
We consider in this Section the cost of operations over Fpk in number of operations over Fp. We give
the notations for the rest of the chapter. Let Fp be a finite field field of prime characteristic p, with p
of thousands digits. Let Fpk be the extension of degree k of Fp. The extension Fpk is defined through
an irreducible polynomial P(X) of degree k. Let A and B be two elements of Fpk . The elements of Fpk
are described in the basis B = (1,γ ,γ2, . . . ,γk−1), for γ a roots of P(X) in Fpk . An element of Fpk is a
polynomial in γ with coefficients in Fp:
Fpk = {
k−1
∑
i=0
aiγ
i,ai ∈ Fp}.
A is represented by
k−1
∑
i=1
aiγ
i and B by B =
k−1
∑
i=0
biγ
i. The product of A and B can be done in two steps. The
first one is the the product of the polynomials, to obtain the polynomialC(X) = A(X)×B(X) of degree
(2k−2). The second step is the polynomial reduction modulo P(X). The cost of this reduction depends
on the form of P(X). The more P(X) is sparse, the more the reduction is efficient. As a consequence,
P(X) should be as possible chosen of the form Xk−β , with β ∈ Fp [50]. In this case, the polynomial
reduction is reduced to multiplications by β and (k−1) additions:
C(X) =C0(X)+C1(X)X
k ≡C0(X)+βC1(X) mod(P(X)).
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with, C0(X),C1(X) of degree (k−1).
The following theorem [50, Theorem 3.75] gives us a natural construction of the extension Fpk using a
sparse representation.
Theorem 5.1. Let k be an integer and Fpk an extension of degree k of Fp, for p a prime number.
There exists β an element of Fp which is not a k-th roots in Fp and such that the polynomial X
k
−β is
irreducible over Fp.
Thus, we can consider that the complexity of a product in Fpk is highly dependent on the complexity
of the product of two polynomials, neglecting the complexity of the modular reduction. We introduce
above the possible multiplications of polynomials.
5.2. The school book method
As the name gives the hint, the school book multiplication is the one we learned at school. The school
book method of two polynomials is the following
A(γ)×B(γ) =
2k−1
∑
i=0
(
i
∑
j=0
(a jbi− j)
)
γ i.
This simple method is very expensive, indeed its complexity is quadratic in the degree of the
polynomials. The cost of this method is k2 multiplications in Fp plus k(2k − 1) addition, thus the
complexity is k(2k−1)Ap + k2Mp.
The interpolation method are an alternative to the school book method, there are efficient for k greater
than a fixed value. This value depends on the method.
5.3. Interpolation method
Let A(X) = a0 + a1X + . . .+ ak−1X
k−1 and B(X) = b0 + b1X + . . .+ bk−1X
k−1 be the polynomials
obtained by substitution (γ becomes X). The result C(X) of A(X)×B(X) is a polynomial of degree
(2k − 1). It is known that a polynomial of degree m is determined by its image in (m+ 1) distinct
values.
Theorem 5.2. Let P(X) be a polynomial of degree m, then P(X) is determined by the image of (m+1)
distinct values.
The multiplications by the interpolation method use in this theorem. The methodology is to find (2k−1)
images of the polynomial C(X) and then to reconstruct C(X) by interpolation. All multiplications by
interpolation follow this scheme
1. Find (2k−1) distinct values in Fp
denoted by α0,α1, . . . ,α2k−2.
2. Evaluate the polynomials A(X) and B(X) in these values
keep in memory A(α0), . . . ,A(α2k−2),B(α0), . . . ,B(α0).
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3. Compute the evaluation of C in these (2k−1) values,
C(αi) = A(αi)B(αi).
4. Use these evaluations of C(X) to reconstruct by interpolation the polynomial C(X).
The complexity of a multiplication by interpolation depends
1. on the evaluation of the A(αi), B(αi),
2. on the multiplications in Fp C(αi) = A(αi)×B(αi),
3. and on the reconstruction of the polynomial expression of C(X).
If we compare the interpolation method with the school book method, we substitute some
multiplications in Fp by multiplications by constants in Fp. The constants are determined by the choice
of the αi values. The drawback is that the multiplication by interpolation need more additions, but as
an addition in Fp is less expensive than a multiplication, for some degree k interpolation methods are
more efficient than the school book method.
Let Ma the cost of a multiplication by the constant a in Fp. The evaluations in (αi){i=0...(2k−1)} cost
2(2k−1)(k−1) (Ap +CMp) ,
when executed using the Horner scheme:
A(αi) = a0+αi (a1+αi(a2+αi[. . .])) .
The computation of the C(αi) = A(αi)×B(αi) involves (2k− 1) multiplications in Fp, which costs
(2k−1)Mp.
Two classical method of interpolation exist, the Lagrange and the Newton interpolation methods.
5.3.1. Lagrange’s interpolation method
We suppose that we have obtained the evaluation of the polynomial A(X) and B(X) in 2k−1, denoted
(α0,α1, . . . ,α2k−2). We then have the image of C(X) = A(X)×B(X) in these 2k− 1 points. The
reconstruction of the coefficients ofC(X) using the Lagrange interpolation is done through the formula:
C(X) =
2k−2
∑
i=0


C(αi)×
2k−2
∏
j=0, j 6=i
(X −α j)
2k−2
∏
j=0, j 6=i
(αi−α j)


. (8)
The complexity of Lagrange’s interpolation is
(2k−1)Mp +(2k−1)(4k−3)CMp + 2(2k−1)(3k−2)Ap. (9)
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5.3.2. Newton’s interpolation
As in the Lagrange’s interpolation, we dispose of the C(αi)s and we want to find the coefficients of
C(X). The Newton’s interpolation needs the construction of intermediates values.
The first step is the computation of the values c′i


c′0 = C(α0)
c′1 = (C(α1)− c
′
0)
1
(α1−α0)
c′2 =
(
(C(α2)− c
′
0)
1
(α2−α0)
− c′1
)
1
(α2−α1)
... =
...
c′2k−2 =
(
(C(α2k−2)− c
′
0)
1
(α2k−2−α0)
− c′1
)
1
(α2k−2−α1)
− . . .
With the c′is, the expression of C(X) is
C(X) = c′0+ c
′
1(X −α0)+ c
′
2(X −α0)(X −α1)
+ . . .+ c′2k−2(X −α0)(X −α1) . . . (X −α2k−2).
The reconstruction of the coefficients of C(X) can be done using the Horner’s scheme
C(X) = c′0+(X −α0)[c
′
1+(X −α1)(c
′
2+(X −α2)(. . .
. . .+(X −α2k)[c
′
2k−1+(X −α2k−1)c
′
2k−2]))].
The efficiency of the multiplication by interpolation depends on the choice of the αis. The Newton’s
interpolation involves divisions be the differences of the αis, these elements can be precomputed
once for all as the αis are fixed. Furthermore, the divisions by (αi −α j)
−1 can be transformed in
multiplication by constants, as we work in a finite field.
The complexity of Newton’s interpolation is the sum of the complexity of the computation of theC(αi),
the c′i and the reconstruction of the coefficients of C(X).
The complexity of Newton’s interpolation is
4(2k2−3k+ 1)Ap + 4(2k
2
−3k+ 1)CMp +(2k−1)Mp.
5.3.3. Comparison between the two methods
The two methods involves the same number of multiplications in the base field Fp: (2k − 1), for
polynomials of degree (k−1).
Theory and Practice of Cryptography and Network Security Protocols and Technologies70
The Lagrange’s interpolation is very important when computations can be parallelised. Indeed, the
computation of the C(αi)×
∏
j 6=i
(X −α j)
∏
j 6=i
(αi −α j)
are independent. The Newton’s interpolation involves less
additions and multiplications by constants than the Lagrange’s one, but we cannot parallelise the
computation. The c′i must be computed one after another.
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
Operation
Method
Lagrange Newton
Ap 12k
2−14k+ 4 8k2−12k+ 4
CMp 8k
2−10k+ 3 8k2−12k+ 4
Mp (2k−1) (2k−1)
Table 5. Complexity in number of operation over the base field
The Lagrange’s interpolation should be privileged when computations can be parallelised and Newton
when the size of the device is limited, typically for smart cards.
5.4. Karatsuba and Toom Cook methods
5.4.1. Karatsuba’s method
The Karatsuba multiplication is a straightforward application of the Newton’s method, for polynomials
of degree 1. The result of the multiplication is a polynomial of degree 2, then we need 2+ 1 = 3
points of interpolation. These values are {0,1,∞}. The Karatsuba multiplication provide the product of
two polynomials of degree 1 in 3 multiplications in the base field, instead of 4 using the school book
method. The multiplication by constants in the Newton multiplication are free, because of the choice of
the interpolation values. Let A(X) = A0+A1X and B(X) = B0+B1X be two polynomials of degree 1
and C(X) = A(X)×B(X).
We evaluate the polynomial C(X) in the point {0,1,∞} using equations 10.
C(0) = (A1X +A0)(B1X +B0) mod(X),
= A0×B0,
C(1) = (A1X +A0)(B1X +B0) mod(X −1),
= (A0+A1)× (B0+B1),
C(∞) = (A1X +A0)(B1X +B0) mod(X −∞),
= A1×B1×X
2 mod(X −∞).
(10)
The evaluation of polynomial C(X) in the 3 values involves 2Ap +3Mp operations in the base field Fp.
Then, we use the formulas in the Newton interpolation to reconstruct the polynomial C(X).
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

c′0 = C(0),
= A0B0,
c′1 = (C(1)− c
′
0)
1
(1−0)
,
= (A0+A1)(B0+B1)−A0B0,
c′2 =
(
(C(∞)− c′0)
1
(∞−0)
− c′1
)
1
(∞−1)
,
=
(
(A1B1X
2−A0B0)
1
(X−0)
− ((A0+A1)(B0+B1)−A0B0)
)
1
(X−1)
mod(X −∞),
= A1B1X
2
X2
− A0B0
X2
−
((A0+A1)(B0+B1)−A0B0)
X
mod(X −∞),
= A1B1.
C(X) = c′0+ c
′
1X + c
′
2X(X −1),
= A0B0+((A0+A1)(B0+B1)−A0B0)X +A1B1X(X −1),
= A0B0+((A0+A1)(B0+B1)−A0B0−A1B1)X +A1B1X
2.
We can resume the computation of the polynomial C(X) using Karatsuba’s multiplication by the
following equation


c0 = A0×B0,
c1 = (A0+A1)× (B0+B1),
c2 = A1×B1,
C(X) = c0+(c1− c0− c2)X + c2X
2.
(11)
For polynomials of degree 1, the complexity of Karatsuba’s multiplication is 3Mp + 4Ap.
The Karatsuba’s multiplication can be recursively applied for polynomials of degree greater than 1. Let
A(X) = A0+A1X + . . .AmX
m, we can split A(X) in two parts of degree smaller or equal to
⌊
m
2
⌋
:
A(X) = A0+A1X + . . .A⌊ m2 ⌋−1
+X⌊
m
2 ⌋
(
A⌊ m2 ⌋
+A⌊ m2 ⌋+1
X + . . .AmX⌊
m
2 ⌋
)
,
= A˜0+Y A˜1, where we denote Y = X
⌊ m2 ⌋.
Then, we apply the Karatsuba’s multiplication to the two parts. Each of the three multiplications
can also be done using the Karatsuba’s multiplication. The recursive application of Karatsuba’s
multiplication is the most efficient method for the computation of polynomials of degree a power of
2. The asymptotic complexity of Karatsuba’s multiplication is O(mlog2(3)) multiplications and O(m)
additions, with m being the degree of the polynomials we want to multiply.
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5.4.2. Toom Cook 3 multiplication
Exactly like the Karatsuba’s multiplication, Toom Cook 3 multiplication is an application of Newton’s
interpolation. The Toom Cook 3 method provide the product of polynomials of degree 2 with 5
multiplications of coefficients, instead of 9 using the school book method multiplication. The values
for the interpolation are {0,1,−1,2,∞}. Unlike the Karatsuba’s method, there are few multiplications
and divisions by constants that we cannot avoid.
Let A(X) = A0 + A1X + A2X
2 and B(X) = B0 + B1X + B2X
2 be polynomials of degree 2 and
C(X) = A(X)× B(X) obtained using the Toom Cook method. The evaluation part of Toom Cook
3 multiplication involves 10 additions of Ai and Bi, for i = 0,1,2. The evaluation of A(X) needs 5
additions.


A(0) = A0,
Sp1 = A0+A2,
A(1) = Sp1+A1,
A(−1) = Sp1−A1,
A(2) = A0+ 2A1+ 4A2,
A(∞) = A2X
2 mod(X −∞).
We begin with the evaluation of C(X) in the αi pour i = 0,1,2,3,4.


C(0) = A(0)×B(0) = A0B0,
C(1) = A(1)×B(1),
C(−1) = A(−1)×B(−1),
C(2) = A(2)×B(2),
C(∞) = A(∞)×B(∞) = A2B2X
4 mod(X −∞).
We apply the Newton’s method to find the coefficients c′i


c′0 = C(0),
c′1 = C(1)− c
′
0,
c′2 =
1
2
(
C(−1)− c′0+ c
′
1
)
,
c′3 =
1
6C(2)−
1
6 c
′
0−
1
3 c
′
1−
1
3 c
′
2,
c′4 = A2B2.
The reconstruction of C(X) is then
C(X) = c′0+ c
′
1X + c
′
2X(X −1)+ c
′
3X(X −1)(X + 1)
c′4X(X −1)(X + 1)(−2).
This step can be resume by the formula
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C(X) = c′0 + (c
′
1− c
′
2− c
′
3−2c
′
4)X +(c
′
2− c
′
4)X
2
+ (c′3−2c
′
4)X
3+ c′4X
4.
Which gives


C0 = c
′
0,
C1 = c
′
1− c
′
2− c
′
3−2c
′
4,
C2 = c
′
2− c
′
4,
C3 = c
′
3−2c
′
4,
C4 = c
′
4,
C(X) = C0+C1X +C2X
2+C3X
3+C4X
4.
For polynomials of degree 2, the complexity of Toom Cook 3 is 5Mp + 11CMp + 11Ap. As for
Karatsuba’s method, the Toom Cook 3 method can be recursively applied. The asymptotic complexity
of ToomCook 3multiplication is O(mlog3(5))multiplications and O(m) additions, where m is the degree
of the polynomials we want to multiply.
5.4.3. Extensions to other extensions
The Toom Cook 3 method can be extended to Toom Cook 5, this multiplication is suited for polynomials
of degree 3. Few works deal with the multiplication of polynomials of degree greater than 3. For
polynomials of degree 4, we can use the Karatsuba’s method. As a consequence, in pairing based
cryptography, field with extension degree of the form 2i3 j are called pairing friendly because we can
use tower fields and for each stage of the tower we use the Karatsuba or Toom Cook 3 multiplication.
However in pairing based cryptography (and in cryptography in general) there are some cases where
it is more interesting to use fields with degree extensions different from 2 and 3. We can cite the
problem of compression (i.e. representing elements in a finite field subgroup with fewer bits than
classical algorithms) for extension fields in terms of algebraic tori Tn(Fq) [63] or applications based
on T30(Fq), such as El Gamal encryption, El Gamal signatures and voting schemes in [69].
Let Fp be a finite field of characteristic greater than 5. For instance for polynomials of degree 5,
we can begin with Karatsuba’s method and then use Karatsuba and Toom Cook 3 for each part. This
construction gives an efficient multiplication for polynomials of degree 5, but not the most efficient. For
degree 5 extensions, Montgomery [58] has proposed a Karatsuba-like formula for 5-terms polynomials
performed using 13 base field multiplications. This work was improved by El Mrabet et all in [30] using
Newton’s interpolation.
We recall here Montgomery’s method for an extension of degree 5. Let A = a0 + a1X + a2X
2 +
a3X
3+a4X
4 and B = b0+b1X +b2X
2+b3X
3+b4X
4 in Fp5 with coefficients over Fp. Montgomery
constructs the polynomial C(X) = A(X) ·B(X) using the following formula C = (a0+ a1X + a2X
2+
a3X
3+ a4X
4)(b0+ b1X + b2X
2+ b3X
3+ b4X
4)
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= (a0+ a1+ a2+ a3+ a4)(b0+ b1+ b2+ b3+ b4)(X
5
−X4+X3)
+(a0−a2−a3−a4)(b0−b2−b3−b4)(X
6
−2X5+ 2X4−X3)
+(a0+ a1+ a2−a4)(b0+ b1+ b2−b4)(−X
5+ 2X4−2X3+X2)
+(a0+ a1−a3−a4)(b0+ b1−b3−b4)(X
5
−2X4+X3)
+(a0−a2−a3)(b0−b2−b3)(−X
6+ 2X5−X4)
+(a1+ a2−a4)(b1+ b2−b4)(−X
4+ 2X3−X2)
+(a3+ a4)(b3+ b4)(X
7
−X6+X4−X3)
+(a0+ a1)(b0+ b1)(−X
5+X4−X2+X)
+(a0−a4)(b0−b4)(−X
6+ 3X5−4X4+ 3X3−X2)
+a4b4(X
8
−X7+X6−2X5+ 3X4−3X3+X2)
+a3b3(−X
7+ 2X6−2X5+X4)
+a1b1(X
4
−2X3+ 2X2−X)
+a0b0(X
6
−3X5+ 3X4−2X3+X2−X + 1).
The cost of these computations is 13Mq + 22Aq. Note that in order to recover the final expression of
the polynomial of degree 8, we have to re-organize the 13 lines to find its coefficients. We denote the
products on each of the 13 lines by ui, 0≤ i ≤ 12 (i.e. u12 = (a0+ a1+ a2+ a3+ a4)(b0+ b1+ b2+
b3+b4), u11 = (a0−a2−a3−a4)(b0−b2−b3−b4) etc.) By re-arranging the formula in function of
the degree of X , we obtain the following expression for C
C = u3X
8
+(−u2−u3+ u6)X
7
+(u0+ 2u2+ u3−u4−u6−u8+ u11)X
6
+(−3u0−2u2−2u3+ 3u4−u5+ 2u8+ u9−u10−2u11+ u12)X
5
+(3u0+ u1+ u2+ 3u3−4u4+ u5+ u6−u7−u8−2u9+ 2u10+ 2u11−u12)X
4
+(−2u0−2u1−3u3+ 3u4−u6+ 2u7+ u9−2u10−u11+ u12)X
3
+(u0+ 2u1+ u3−u4−u5−u7+ u10)X
2
+(−u0−u1+ u5)X
+ u0.
Considering this expression, hidden additions must be taken in account. Once every simplification is
done, the total complexity of Montgomery’s method is 13Mp + 62Ap.
In [30], the Newton’s interpolation gives a better result for the multiplication of 5-terms polynomials.
The interpolation values are α0 = 0, α1 = 1, α2 = −1, α3 = 2, α4 = −2, α5 = 4, α6 = −4, α7 = 3,
α8 =∞. With these values, the evaluations of A and B are only composed of shifts and additions. Details
are provide in [30], the evaluations of A(X) and B(X) have a total complexity of 48Ap. The evaluation
of C(X) in the αis costs 9Mp. The computation of the c
′
is is not straightforward. Indeed, there are
few divisions by 3, 5 and 7 that appear in the formula Section 5.3.2. To avoid the computation of a
division which is an expensive operation over a finite field, using a trick on the binary decomposition of
integers, they perform very efficiently the divisions. The complexity for these divisions is smaller than
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2Ap. The global complexity for the computation of the c
′
is is then 64Ap. Finally, the reconstruction of
the polynomial C(X) using the Horner’s scheme has a complexity of 28Ap. And the total complexity
of the 5-terms polynomials is 9Mq + 137Aq.
The comparison with Montgomery’s result is not evident, but implementations in [30] shows that the
results are more efficient than the Montgomery’s one.
In the two articles, the authors give also results for 6-terms and 7-terms polynomials.
The fact that we can compute efficiently the multiplication for extensions greater than 2 and 3 gives the
opportunity to consider pairing computation over elliptic curve with an embedding degree k different
from 2i3 j and can improve the implementation of pairings. But this work is still to be made.
5.5. Original representation of finite fields
In the previous section we consider efficient multiplications for a classical representation of finite fields
and extension of finite fields. But they are many ways to represent a finite field. In [22], the authors use
an original representation of finite field to provide a very efficient implementation of a pairing. This
original representation is the Residue Number System (RNS) representation and it was developed in
[7, 8]. The RNS representation relays on the Chinese remainder theorem. Let B = {m1, . . . ,mn} be a
set of co-prime natural integers, M =
n
∏
i=1
mi and 0≤ X < M. There exists a unique representation XB of
X in the basis B, XB = {X mod m1, . . .X mod mn}= {x1,x2, . . . ,xn}. Given XB , we can reconstruct
X using the Chinese Remainder theorem:
X =
(
n
∑
i=1
(xi×b
−1
i mod mi)×bi
)
mod M, where bi =
M
mi
.
The RNS representation is obviously very interesting for parallel computations. An efficient
multiplication in RNS representation is described in [7, 8]. This multiplication is based on the
Montgomery modular multiplication. In [22], the authors present two very efficient implementation
of a pairing algorithm on an FPGA, in RNS representation. They implement the optimal Ate pairing at
several security levels over Altera and Xilinx FPGA. They compare there result with previous work and
obtaint very nice results.
5.6. The arithmetic of Pairings
The complexity of a computation of a pairing depends on the finite field and the arithmetic underlying,
but also of the model and the equation of the elliptic curve and the choice of the coordinates. Usually,
an elliptic curve is represented using the short Weierstrass equation which is on the form E : y2 =
x3+ ax+ b, with a and b elements of the finite field Fp. In [20], Brier and Joye show that the value a
can be chosen to be −3. This value contributes to improve the computation of pairings. But, even on
a short Weierstrass equation, several cases exist, we can have b = 0, a = 0 with b a square or not just
an integer. For each option, the coordinates have also an influence on the efficiency of the computation
of a pairing. The coordinates are usually chosen between affine, Projective and Jacobian. The affine
coordinates are often put aside. Indeed, the operations over the elliptic curve in affine coordinates
involves inversion over finite fields. As inversion over a finite field is an expensive operation, one try to
avoid them so far as possible. To achieve this aim, the Projective or Jacobian coordinates are suitable,
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as by construction, the Projective and Jacobian coordinates substitute inversions in affine coordinates
into multiplications. The fact that the affine coordinates involves inversions was a drawback to their use
in pairing based cryptography. In [51], the authors analyzed the use of affine coordinates for pairing
based cryptography. They adapt two known techniques for speeding up field inversion to the pairing
based cryptography case. They found out that for high security levels, an implementation in affine
coordinates of a pairing will be much faster than an implementation in projective coordinates. The
first technique to improve the inversion consists in computing inverses in extension fields by using
towers of extension field and transform inverse computation to subfield computations via the norm map.
Using this technique, the authors reduce drastically the ratio of the costs of inversions to multiplications
in extension fields. This is very interesting for the computation of pairings over a large extension
field, typically at high level security such as 256 bits. The second trick is to take advantage of the
inversion-sharing, a standard trick whenever several inversions are computed at once. This method
involves the lecture of the binary expansion from right to left, instead of left to right. This second
method is very interesting when multi-core processors are used, indeed, it can be easily parallelized. We
can find in [51] detailed performance numbers with timing for base field and extension field arithmetic.
For security level more reasonable, the Projective and Jacobian coordinates are for now more suitable.
In [24], the authors resume, compare and improve several works dealing with the optimizations of
pairings, considering all the possibilities for the Weierstrass equation. They give efficient computations
in Jacobian and Projective coordinates. We resume there work in Table 6.
Curve Doubling Prev Doubling
Curve order Addition Result Addition
Twist deg. Result of [24]
y2 = x3+ ax Ma +(2k/d + 2)Mp + 8Sp [2] Ma +(2k/d + 1)Mp + 11Sp
any (2k/d + 12)Mp + Sp (2k/d + 10)Mp + 6Sp
d = 2,4 New coord. Jacobian
y2 = x3+ c2 (2k/d + 3)Mp + 5Sp [23] (2k/d + 3)Mp + 5Sp
3|♯E Mc +(2k/d + 3)Mp + 5Sp Mc +(2k/d + 3)Mp + 5Sp
d = 2,6 Projective Projective
y2 = x3+ b Mb +(2k/d + 2)Mp + 7Sp [2] (2k/d + 3)Mp + 8Sp
3 ∤ ♯E Mb +(2k/d + 2)Mp + 7Sp (2k/d + 3)Mp + 8Sp
d = 2,6 Projective Jacobian
y2 = x3+ b Mb +(k+ 6)Mp + 7Sp [31] Mb +(2k+ 8)Mp + 9Sp
any (k+ 16)Mp + 3Sp not reported
d = 3 Projective Projective
Table 6. Comparaison of pairings considering Weierstrass models
There exists several model of elliptic curves, for instance
• Short Weierstrass: y2 = x3+ ax+ b, for a, b in K.
• Legendre coordinates: y2 = x(x−1)(x−λ ), for λ ∈ K.
• Montgomery: by2 = x3+ ax2+ x, for a, b in K.
• Edwards coordinates: x2+ y2 = c(1+ x2y2) over K.
• Huff’s coordinates: aX(Y 2−Z2) = bY (X2−Z2) for a2 6= b2 6= 0 over K.
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Several works study the efficiency of an implementation of pairing over some of these models of elliptic
curves. The Edwards elliptic curves were recently introduced in cryptographie. In [32], Edwards
demonstrates that every elliptic curve E defined over an algebraic number field is birationally equivalent
over some extension of that field to a curve given by the equation:
x2+ y2 = c2(1+ x2y2). (12)
Edwards curves became interesting for elliptic curve cryptography when it was proven by Bernstein
and Lange in [18] that they provide addition and doubling formulas faster than all addition formulas
known at that time. The advantage of Edwards coordinates is that the addition law can be complete (i.e.
the formulas for adding or doubling two points are the same) and thus the exponentiation in Edwards
coordinates is naturally protected against side channel attacks. Recently, the Edwards elliptic curves
were used to compute pairings [3, 44]. In [46], the authors study the Huff’s model of an elliptic curve,
they provide explicit formulae for fast doubling and addition and also for Tate pairing computation.
Another example is the work in [72], in this work the authors consider the Selmer elliptic curves,
they present formulae for doubling, addition and pairing computations. They compare there results to
various elliptic curve models such as Weierstrass, Edwards, Hessian. There is many choices for the
equation/model of the elliptic curve and of the coordinates, the website [17] regroups every new result
on this subject. It is a very nice overview of this topic of research.
6. Conclusions
We presented the various pairings available for cryptographic use. As the pairing are aimed to be
implemented in smart cards, the efficiency of a pairing implementation is a subject of several research.
We presented optimizations developed for the improvement of a pairing implementation. We introduced
the twisted elliptic curve which leads to the denominator elimination. We constructed the extension field
Fpk using tower fields and the method for an efficient multiplication over each step of the tower. We
described efficient squaring method combine with the cyclotomic subgroup. We also highlighted the
fact that the choice of the model of the elliptic curve and the choice of the coordinates is important for an
efficient implementation. We saw that the representation of an element in the base field Fp with original
definition can leads to very efficient implementation. To conclude, the optimizations of pairing are a
very interesting point of research and a lot of scientists work hardly to find new optimizations. Further
research can follow the presented optimizations and adapt to the case of pairings over hyperelliptic
curves, or find any other point of optimizations in the implementation.
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